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In this article we describe and analyze the concept of reality developed by the Austrian 
theoretical physicist Ludwig Boltzmann. It is our thesis that Boltzmann was fully aware that 
reality could, and actually was, described by different points of view. In spite of this, 
Boltzmann did not renounce the idea that reality is real. We also discuss his main 
motivations to be strongly involved with philosophy of science, as well as further 
developments made by Boltzmann himself of his main philosophical ideas, namely scientific 
theories as images of Nature and its consequences. We end the paper with a discussion 
about the modernity of Boltzmann’s philosophy of science. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Ludwig Eduard Boltzmann was born on 20 February 1844 in Vienna. In 1863 
he started his studies in natural sciences at the University of Vienna and 
finished his doctorate in physics in 1866, publishing in this same year a paper 
on the mechanical theory of heat. This choice of topic shows clearly his early 
interest on the fundamentals of physics, interest which he followed through his 
entire career. His academic life led him to teaching, research and 
administrative positions in Vienna, then Graz, Munich, back to Vienna, 
Leipzig and Vienna yet again in 1902, where he stayed until his death by 
suicide on 5 September 1906 in Duino, a small city close to Trieste, when on 
vacation. Boltzmann’s interest in occupying different academic positions were 
a consequence of his goal of following his most basic ambition: contribute for 
the scientific progress and institutional consolidation of theoretical physics.  
 
                                                 
1 Physics Institute, University of Brazil – UFRJ, Ilha do Fundão, CxP 68532, Rio de Janeiro, 21941-972 RJ, 
Brazil; e-mail: mbr@if.ufrj.br 
 
2 Department of Philosophy, State University of Rio de Janeiro – UERJ, Rua São Francisco Xavier 524, Rio 
de Janeiro, 20550-013 RJ, Brazil; e-mail: guto@cbpf.br 
 2
Boltzmann’s contributions to philosophy of science were born out of his 
intense debates with many other eminent scientists of the time, like 
Helmholtz, Hertz, Mach, Ostwald, Duhem, Poincaré, Planck, on the aims and 
methods of theoretical physics. The intensity and continuity of his 
participation in these debates shows how important and necessary he 
considered them for the determination of the nature of theoretical physics. He 
did not seek to establish a philosophy for physics, even less a philosophy of 
science in general. His epistemological style was of defending his viewpoints 
about the fundamentals of science against the criticisms of other scientists and 
philosophers, who, in his opinion, had mistaken viewpoints about the nature of 
scientific theories. 
 
Boltzmann’s style of presenting his epistemological viewpoints was also due 
to one of his most important epistemological principles, which established that 
in the process of becoming hegemonic among the members of the scientific 
community, no scientific theory could, for this very reason, exclude other 
theories. According to Boltzmann, the exclusion of other theories would 
eliminate the possibility of progress in science since the dogmatic process 
intrinsic to this behavior would lead to nothing positive. In his view such a 
process would end up with the impoverishment of the scientific enterprise. 
Thus, when participating on the debates of his time, Boltzmann was in favor 
of an open attitude regarding the analysis of various theories. His position in 
favor of pluralism was reinforced by his belief that, in not a too distant future, 
science would be deeply transformed in a way that nobody at his time could 
anticipate with certainty. 
 
Boltzmann viewed the end of the 19th century as an epoch of doubts, distrust 
and growing bad feelings of the scientists towards science. Inasmuch as many 
were convinced that important changes would forcefully occur, that realization 
was partially responsible in motivating them to defend their ideas in the hope 
that one among them could help remove science from the stalemate that it 
found itself. Such an impasse was due to the inconclusiveness of the debates 
about the importance of the hypotheses in physics, how a physical theory is 
built upon, whether or not one must always start from empirical known facts 
or one could freely use scientific ingenuity and creativity, or still if the 
physical theories should describe, instead of explaining, the natural 
phenomena, leaving aside the old ideal of reaching the real causes of them.  
 
When participating in those epistemological discussions, Boltzmann sought 
first of all to assure the survival of his favorite theories, guaranteeing, at the 
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same time, a place for other theories. The ability of a certain theory to predict 
new phenomena does not make it able to predict its own future and, even less, 
of science. On the other hand, a theory that had already produced good results 
should not have been abandoned. Recognizing the scientific limits of a theory 
does not mean that it should be excluded from the realm of science. Since a 
theory is incapable of predicting its own future, this conclusion was probably 
the main reason that motivated Boltzmann in trying to better understand the 
process along which science develops. His interpretation of Darwinism gave 
him the basis from where he was able to reach some conclusions, which 
afterwards opened up the way for him to follow along the path he intended to 
follow. For Boltzmann a scientific theory is nothing more than a 
representation of Nature. 
  
 
2. Basic ideas on reality and scientific truth 
 
According to Boltzmann, the question about the existence of the external 
world, or matter, must be seen in the light of another problem: “does the 
answer of this question complicate or simplify our image of the world 
(weltbild)?” 3 Boltzmann seems to feel necessary to avoid useless discussions, 
such as those frequently promoted by philosophers. Even though he 
recognized that there were no definitive proofs either in favor or against the 
existence of matter, at least at his epoch, he considered that the belief in either 
position to be ideology. Although he did not define what he meant by 
ideology, it seems correct to state that for him this word had a negative 
meaning. In any case, both idealism and realism are, in the end, ideologies. 
Another important example, certainly of negative connotation and more 
important than the previous one, about what seems to be Boltzmann’s 
viewpoint about ideology comes from solipsism. Boltzmann had a true horror 
of idealism, referring to it as the major madness ever created by the human 
mind, since idealism denies the existence of the external material world. 
 
From the way he discussed this subject, Boltzmann seems to believe that it is 
impossible not to choose one of the two positions, namely, idealism or 
realism. Inasmuch as one cannot in fact prove which position is best, choosing 
between them can only be made by arguing in favor of an evaluation of the 
weak points of each position. Then, by evaluating the weak points of idealism, 
                                                 
3 Boltzmann, L., 1905, “Über die Frage nach der objektiven Existenz der Vorgänge in der unbelebten Natur”, 
in “Populäre Schriften”, ed. J.A. Barth ,(Leipzig), 1905, p. 170 
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which could not overcome the gap between what is alive and what is not alive, 
Boltzmann made his choice for the realism. Nevertheless, although he left no 
doubt about his preference, Boltzmann was careful in the way he referred to 
these philosophical systems, stating that they are solely manners of 
expressions (Ausdruckweise) used for scientists and philosophers to convey 
their ideas about reality. Realism has a mode of expression more adequate 
than of idealism. Choosing the most appropriate or most adequate expressing 
mode would allow the disappearance of false problems. One would not lose so 
much time in trying to answer false questions, which, according to Boltzmann, 
is one of the main obstacles to be avoided. The choice of the most adequate 
expressing mode of science leads us directly to the core of the epistemological 
thinking of the Austrian physicist.  
 
At the end of the 19th century Boltzmann sought to show that all scientific 
theories are nothing more than representations, that is, constructions of the 
natural phenomena. By being representations, scientific theories cannot aim to 
know Nature itself, knowledge which would explain why the natural 
phenomena show themselves to us the way we observe them, since such 
ultimate knowledge is, and will ever be, unknowable. As a consequence, a 
scientific theory will never be complete or definitively true. This viewpoint 
actually redefines the concept of scientific truth by advancing the notion that 
the identification of the theory with the researched objects is a weak one, that 
is, such identification (1) cannot be unique, (2) cannot be complete and (3) is 
temporarily limited, since scientific theories are nothing more than images of 
Nature. As a consequence, (1.1) the same aspects of Nature4 can be 
represented by more than one theory, which are often in competition among 
themselves for the preference of the scientific community, (2.1) by being 
representations scientific theories will never be able to show all aspects of 
natural phenomena, inasmuch as such a complete knowledge is unknowable, 
and (3.1) a scientific theory can, and almost surely will, one day, be replaced 
by another. It is the possibility of the replacement of one theory by another 
that defines and constitutes the scientific progress. 
 
Boltzmann's ideas about scientific models as representations are clearly stated 
in the passage below, quoted from the entry “model” of the 1902 edition of 
the Encyclopedia Britannica. 
 
                                                 
4 In this article we shall use the words “Nature”, “matter” and “external world” as synonyms. 
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Models in the mathematical, physical and mechanical sciences are of the 
greatest importance. Long ago philosophy perceived the essence of our 
process of thought to lie in the fact that we attach to the various real 
objects around us particular physical attributes - our concepts - and by 
means of these try to represent the objects to our minds. Such views were 
formerly regarded by mathematicians and physicists as nothing more than 
unfertile speculations, but in more recent times they have been brought by 
J. C. Maxwell, H. v. Helmholtz, E. Mach, H. Hertz and many others into 
intimate relation with the whole body of mathematical and physical theory. 
On this view our thoughts stand to things in the same relation as models to 
the objects they represent. The essence of the process is the attachment of 
one concept having a definite content to each thing, but without implying 
complete similarity between thing and thought; for naturally we can know 
but little of the resemblance of our thoughts to the things to which we 
attach them. What resemblance there is, lies principally in the nature of the 
connexion, the correlation being analogous to that which obtains between 
thought and language, language and writing. (…) Here, of course, the 
symbolization of the thing is the important point, though, where feasible, 
the utmost possible correspondence is sought between the two (…) we are 
simply extending and continuing the principle by means of which we 
comprehend objects in thought and represent them in language or writing.5 
 
Boltzmann also pointed out that the thesis that a scientific theory is a 
representation was not new. Kant, in the 18th century, and Maxwell, one of the 
most important influences upon him in the middle of the 19th century, had both 
defended similar theses. Other contemporary physicists, like Hertz and 
Helmholtz, shared similar views. By remembering that others like Kant and 
Maxwell had already expressed similar propositions, Boltzmann wished to 
make sure that any theory or model would be continuously perfected, without 
being excluded by any other “tribunal” than the experience. 
 
The most important epistemological conclusion reached by Boltzmann, and 
which constitutes the core of his philosophical thinking, is usually called 
theoretical pluralism. This is a consequence of the thesis that all scientific 
theories are representations of Nature. By being a representation, a scientific 
theory is, therefore, initially a free creation of the scientist who can formulate 
it from a purely personal perspective, where metaphysical presuppositions, 
theoretical options, preferences for a certain type of mathematical language, 
                                                 
5 Boltzmann, L., 1902, “Model”, in “Theoretical Physics and Philosophical  Problems: Selected Writings”, ed. 
B. McGuiness (Reidel: Dordretcht), 1974, p. 213 
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and even the dismissal of some observational data, can enter into its 
formulation. That happens in the period when the theory is formulated. 
However, in order to make this theory eligible to become part of science, it is 
necessary for it to be confronted by the experience. If it is not approved in this 
crucial test, the theory must be reformulated, or even put aside. Boltzmann 
also emphasized that since all scientific theories are, to some extent, free 
creations of scientists, scientific work is impossible without the use of 
theoretical concepts, which originates from the fact that it is impossible the 
formulation of any scientific theory simply from the mere observation of 
natural phenomena. 
 
Theoretical pluralism also states that the same natural phenomenon can be 
explained through different theories. Still according to Boltzmann, this 
possibility has its origins in the fact that, as seen above, any theory is a 
representation, a construction, an image of the natural external world, and 
nothing more than that. From Boltzmann’s point of view one cannot do 
science in any other way. Either it is a construction, a representation, or the 
theory is not scientific. In Boltzmann's words: 
 
(…) Hertz makes physicists properly aware of something philosophers 
had no doubt long since stated, namely that no theory can be objective, 
actually coinciding with nature, but rather that each theory is only a 
mental picture of phenomena, related to them as sign is to designatum.  
 
(…) From this it follows that it cannot be our task to find an absolutely 
correct theory but rather a picture that is, as simple as possible and that 
represents phenomena as accurately as possible. One might even 
conceive of two quite different theories both equally simple and equally 
congruent with phenomena, which therefore in spite of their difference 
are equally correct. The assertion that a given theory is the only correct 
one can only express our subjective conviction that there could not be 
another equally simple and fitting image.6 
 
In summary, theoretical pluralism synthesizes the fact that, since knowledge 
of Nature itself is impossible, a theory can only be better than another. It is the 
necessary mechanism which prevents science from running the risk of 
stagnation. Within this perspective, truth can only be provisional, and is in 
                                                 
6Boltzmann, L., “On the Development of the Methods of Theoretical Physics in Recent Times”, in 
“Theoretical Physics and Philosophical  Problems: Selected Writings”, ed. B. McGuiness (Reidel: 
Dordretcht), 1974, p. 90  
 7
fact an approximation achieved by different means, that is, by different 
theoretical images. 
 
An important consequence of Boltzmann's theoretical pluralism is his notion 
of scientific truth. One of the main features of modern science is that since the 
beginning of the modern scientific revolution with Galileo, scientists began to 
define truth as the complete correspondence between models and 
observations. We may term this relationship as strong correspondence. 
Nevertheless, since Boltzmann's main thesis states that all scientific theories 
are representations of natural phenomena, that is, they are not capable of 
determining what really constitutes Nature, the concept of truth in modern 
science should no longer be one which seeks to determine Nature itself. 
Therefore, within the context of Boltzmann's epistemological thinking, this 
strong concept of correspondence should be replaced by a weak 
correspondence which will in turn enable scientists to choose one model 
among other possible ones, since more than one model, or theory, may well 
represent the same group of natural phenomena and/or experimental data. At 
this moment Boltzmann advances another definition of scientific truth: the 
adequacy. According to him, theory A is more adequate than theory B if the 
former is capable of explaining more rationally, more intelligibly, a certain set 
of natural phenomena, than the latter. In his own words, 
 
(…) let me choose as goal of the present talk not just kinetic molecular 
theory but a largely specialized branch of it. Far from wishing to deny 
that this contains hypothetical elements, I must declare that branch to 
be a picture that boldly transcends pure facts of observation, and yet I 
regard it as not unworthy of discussion at this point; a measure of my 
confidence in the utility of the hypotheses as soon as they throw new 
light on certain peculiar features of the observed facts, representing 
their interrelation with a clarity unattainable by other means. Of course 
we shall always have to remember that we are dealing with hypotheses 
capable and needful of constant further development and to be 
abandoned only when all the relations they represent can be understood 
even more clearly in some other way. 
 
(…) We must not aspire to derive nature from our concepts, but must 
adapt the latter to the former. We must not think that everything can be 
arranged according to our categories or that there is such a thing as a 
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most perfect arrangement: it will only ever be a variable one, merely 
adapted to current needs.7 
 
He also noted that since theories are images of Nature, all have some 
explanatory power and that a good theory is achieved by being carefully 
crafted by scientists, in a process similar to Darwin's Natural Selection. 
 
Mach himself has ingeniously discussed the fact that no theory is 
absolutely true, and equally hardly any absolutely false either, but each 
must gradually be perfected, as organisms must according to Darwin's 
theory. By being strongly attacked, a theory can gradually shed 
inappropriate elements while the appropriate residue remains.8 
 
In summary, Boltzmann in effect identifies scientific truth with adequacy and 
the latter with the concept of weak correspondence between our scientific 
theories and Nature. As opposed to the strong correspondence, which 
identifies completely a theory with Nature, his concept of weak 
correspondence implies, as stated above, theoretical pluralism, that is, (1) the 
non uniqueness of any scientific theory – uniqueness implies dogmatism –, (2) 
the notion of the unavoidable incompleteness of any theory as they are images 
of Nature – completeness implies dogmatism – and that (3) all scientific 
theories are temporally limited, i.e., no theory is definitive – all will be 
replaced one day by better ones.  
 
3. Developments 
 
Boltzmann himself developed further various consequences of the views 
outlined above. As a convicted Darwinist, he extended the notion of 
theoretical pluralism to reason itself. For Boltzmann, the brain was a device, 
an organ aimed at the creation of images of the world which, due to the great 
usefulness of these images to the conservation of the human species, as 
determined by Darwin’s theory of Natural Selection, has reached a certain 
degree of perfection. The brain can be thought of as being a physical structure 
ruled by evolution. So, reason will necessarily evolve by means of Darwin’s 
                                                 
7 Boltzmann, L., “On Statistical Mechanics”, in “Theoretical Physics and Philosophical  Problems: Selected 
Writings”, ed. B. McGuiness (Reidel: Dordretcht), 1974, pp. 163, 166 
8 Boltzmann, L., “An Inaugural Lecture on Natural Philosophy”, in “Theoretical Physics and Philosophical  
Problems: Selected Writings”, ed. B. McGuiness (Reidel: Dordretcht), 1974, p. 153 
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Natural Selection, meaning that Kant’s a priori philosophical category can, 
and will, change with time.  
 
Another important point to note is that although theories are representations, 
and, as we saw above, personal theoretical options can enter in their 
formulation, they are not entirely arbitrary due to the principle of weak 
correspondence between scientific theories and the external world, principle 
which is implicit in Boltzmann’s philosophical thinking. The basic aim of any 
theory is to represent something that is going on in Nature, and a successful 
theory does achieve this to a considerable extent. Therefore, such a theory can 
use some symbols, or a specific mathematical language, just as conventions. 
However, since Nature itself must be represented in it, or, stating the same, 
Nature must be weakly corresponded in any theory, conventions will always 
be limited to only those aspects of the model, of the constructed 
representation, which are not perceived, in that theory, as being directly 
dictated by Nature. Thus, under Boltzmann's perspective, one cannot say that 
theories are just conventions, because after being carefully crafted by the 
scientists as representations of unique, non-arbitrary, natural phenomena, they 
become attached to them, and end up saying something about what is really 
going on in Nature. 
 
In addition, besides being a good representation, there is still another criterion 
capable of conducting the preference of scientists towards one particular 
model: its predictive ability. This is important because once a certain 
theoretical prediction is confirmed, the scientific knowledge about Nature 
increases quantitatively due to the weak correspondence principle. A correct 
prediction is also important because it is formulated within the context of a 
specific theoretical picture. So, by being capable of predicting unknown 
phenomena, a model shows all its explanatory power since it is not only 
capable of announcing the already known “pieces”, but it is also able to go 
even further, showing the existence of other still missing pieces which are 
necessary for a deeper and more organized understanding of Nature. One 
cannot forget that one of the most important aims of science is to increase and 
organize our knowledge about Nature, and thus, a certain theory is richer than 
others if it is able to better contribute to such an increase and organization. 
Such a preference for the richer theories makes them more likely to be used 
and developed than the poorer ones – even by the incorporation of many 
useful elements of the poorer theories – and after a while the distance between 
them can be so great that it may no longer be worth for researchers to keep on 
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working with the poorer representations, which are then put aside and, 
eventually, forgotten. 
 
One must stress that the theoretical pluralism does not necessarily imply 
competition among the different theories, but often means complementarity. 
Inasmuch as all theories have some explanatory power, all theories end up 
saying something about the physical process that are going on in Nature since  
not all theories use the same set of ideas and phenomena which they seek to 
explain. Therefore, the emergence of different theories for similar sets of 
physical phenomena far from being a problem for our better understanding of 
Nature is an essential ingredient for it. And if those different theories have 
elements which contradict each other, observations and experimentation 
provide us the first mechanism, but not the only ones, which allows us to 
discard the inappropriate elements of the emergent theories. 
 
Under Boltzmann’s view we can clearly see the importance of orthodoxy in 
science. Inasmuch as the validation of new theories and models usually takes 
time, a certain degree of conservatism towards new theories and models, and 
skepticism towards new observations, is, nevertheless, necessary since it is not 
possible to build a sound conceptual and experimental scientific body when 
there is a continual change in the fundamental scientific concepts. Such 
skepticism is also evidence of the existence of critique in science, which is one 
of the most important ingredients of modern scientific reasoning and practice. 
Therefore, orthodoxy plays the healthy role of preserving the scientific 
knowledge obtained on solid bases until new theories prove to have sufficient 
internal consistency and experimental validation.  
 
However, when strong conservatism and orthodoxy becomes deep rooted in 
the scientific community, a situation may arise that, if not effectively and 
successfully challenged, may lead the community to avoid altogether any kind 
of change of the established ideas.9 In such an environment the established 
theories crystallize, becoming dogmatic and the scientific debate ceases to 
exist. So, we can conclude that dogmatism works against scientific progress 
and the adoption of the theoretical pluralism can avoid its dangers, something 
that Boltzmann’s was very much aware due to his passionate defense of the 
atomic concept which, at the time, was facing a growing number of powerful 
opponents, like Ostwald and Georg Helm (1851-1923), who considered the 
atomic picture of the world outdated and proposed an entirely energetic view 
                                                 
9 Ribeiro, M. B. & Videira, A. A. P., “Dogmatism and Theoretical Pluralism in Modern Cosmology”, 
Apeiron, vol. 5, Nr. 3-4 (1998) 227-234; arXiv.org: physics/9806011 
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of the physical world. Boltzmann feared that such a purely energetic 
representation would lead physics to become dogmatic, a fact that would 
inevitably also lead to its stagnation. So, when Boltzmann advanced 
theoretical pluralism he had the goal of establishing a clear and unreachable 
limit for dogmatism. Boltzmann believed that once theoretical pluralism were 
accepted and completely absorbed in the research practice, it would not allow 
that, once proposed, a theory could be excluded from the scientific scenario. 
 
Another consequence of the theoretical pluralism is that if our scientific 
theories and models represent Nature by constructions, their descriptions are 
unavoidably and intrinsically limited. So, if scientific theories are incomplete, 
there must be knowledge outside science. In other words, there must be other 
types of knowledge which cannot be classified as scientific, but which 
nevertheless do reflect, or mirror, processes and phenomena that do occur in 
Nature. That type of knowledge can be considered unstructured in the sense 
that it lacks internal connections produced by theoretical thinking. So, that 
kind of knowledge is affirmative knowledge in the sense that is states that 
things are as they are because they are found, experimented or observed to be 
as they are. No further attempts at structuring and searching for internal and 
external connections are made. If so, and successful, such an affirmative 
knowledge becomes no longer affirmative and starts to transmute into 
phenomenological science. The intrinsic incompleteness of any scientific 
discipline means that various types of affirmative knowledges will always 
exist. 
 
Theoretical pluralism also has consequences for the ethics among scientists. 
By being representations, that is, constructions from, or images of, Nature, the 
scientific theories are therefore human constructions, reflecting Nature without 
governing them. So, those images are built by generations of scientists and 
this line of thought leads us inevitably to suppose that the relationship among 
the scientists themselves should play a relevant role in this constructive 
process. The existence of a free flow of ideas is essential for this construction, 
as well as the permanent critique and stimuli for the existence of motivations 
for the scientist. All that implies certain behavioral rules, that is, an ethics, 
required so that the scientific enterprise moves on and avoids stagnation. 
Although our scientific theories do reflect Nature, they are, and will ever be, 
human constructions and, therefore, rules obliging the respect and possible 
acceptance of different ideas become essential. 
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In summary, Boltzmann’s views about reality mean that one cannot confuse 
the concepts of “reality” and “real”. The former are the set of mental pictures, 
or images of Nature created by our brains, whereas the latter is Nature itself, 
the external world, whose ultimate knowledge is and will ever be unknowable. 
Nature constitutes what is real and, therefore, is outside our brains. Reality, 
however, is the collection of mental pictures created in our brains by its 
interface with what is real, with Nature. Reality, thus, connects our brains with 
what is real, with the external world, meaning that reality is realistic. This last 
statement means exactly this connection. Reason then can be thought of as 
being the “logical rules” 10 that govern reality. But, since reality is made of 
mental pictures, or images, of Nature, and which will necessarily change with 
time, we can only conclude that reality and reason must evolve. 
 
4. Modern consequences of Boltzmann’s ideas 
 
A hundred years after Boltzmann’s death we are entitled to ask how modern 
Boltzmann’s philosophy of science really is. Are his ideas capable of 
influencing our modern thinking? Could his epistemology be further 
developed and, if so, what news results and conclusions could it bring about? 
 
Although we cannot know whether or not there will ever be a consensus on 
the adequate interpretation of the philosophical ideas developed by 
Boltzmann, it seems to us that it is impossible to deny that he developed his 
ideas with the intention of using them to counteract the creation of scientific 
and philosophical dogmas. Boltzmann believed in the importance of his ideas, 
mainly because they could contribute to the strengthening and improvement of 
science, philosophy and the human life in general. His ideas could serve as 
inspiration for the eternal path taken by the human species in its struggle for 
survival and should not be considered as the last words about such topics. For 
Boltzmann the authentic progress would only be achieved if human beings 
could continuously improve themselves. His definition of certainty frames this 
perspective: “We design as true the actions whose results produce desired 
things, as well as the representations that direct us to act that way.” 11 In 
other words, Boltzmann seems to place “action”, “intention”, “representation” 
and “truth” on the same level of importance. These four concepts would 
constitute a balanced and indivisible web. The key idea responsible for the 
                                                 
10 Boltzmann did not believe in “logical rules of reason” in the strict sense, but only as a result of the 
evolutionary processes incurred in our brains. 
11 Boltzmann, L., “Populäre Schriften,” ed. J. Barth, (Lepizig), 1905, p. 164 
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maintenance of this balance is exactly his concept that the scientific theories 
are representations. 
 
One can conclude by stating that our theoretical constructions, or images of 
Nature, can be applied to physics itself. So, if physics is a construction, as a 
logical consequence of Boltzmann’s ideas physics must also follow Darwinian 
Natural Selection as a solution to its philosophical problems. Actually, 
Darwinism in this sense can be applied to science in general. Therefore, one 
must not seek explanations beyond human activity and beyond what we can 
reach with our ordinary senses and our brains.  
 
The activity of constructing images of the external world, as well as the 
process of improving them so they become more adequate representations, are 
instinctive to human beings12 and, therefore, they are not the solely privilege 
of scientists. Ever since their appearance on this planet, humans have been 
using their ability to construct internal mental pictures of the external world to 
control their surrounding environments. In order to survive, humans need to 
act and intervene on the environment. All representations, including those we 
call scientific theories, have a practical side which allows mankind to make 
better use of Nature in their own benefit. Therefore, representing is a human 
activity as ordinary as any other and there must be a common substratum to 
any human activity, being not relevant if this activity is intellectual or not. 
Thus, representing becomes a construction since it requires practical decisions 
and choices necessary to solve problems whose solutions we seek. 
Representing then is nothing more than acting. 
 
 
                                                 
12 L. Boltzmann, “Populäre Schriften,” ed. J. Barth, (Lepizig), 1905, p. 179 
